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Abstract
We analyse a firm’s investment decision in a regional economy composed of two coun-
tries. The firm already manufactures a horizontally diﬀerentiated good in the region and
we determine the firm’s equilibrium location choice for the new good and the welfare
consequences of fiscal competition between the two countries. We find that the firm’s
location decision is eﬃcient. Fiscal competition does not aﬀect the location of produc-
tion but redistributes rents between the firm and the taxpayers of the host country.
The implications of endogenous product diﬀerentiation and the new good being pro-
duced by a competing firm are also considered. As far as we know, the tax competition
literature has not previously addressed the issue of product diﬀerentiation.
Keywords: FDI, import substitution, market size, MNEs, product diﬀerentiation
JEL classifications: F21, F23, L22
1 Introduction
International policy competition to attract foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI)
has become commonplace in the past thirty years and seems to be on the rise.1 Firms
care about the location of their production facilities, wanting to minimize their produc-
tion costs while being close to their major consumer markets. For their part, national
governments prefer local manufacturing over imports, as this provides domestic jobs
and demand for local services as well as cheaper consumer products. Given this pref-
erence for local production, a government may oﬀer incentives in order to persuade
firms to locate their production facilities within its territory. When there is more than
one candidate country as host of the FDI, international fiscal competition may arise
to attract the manufacturing facilities.
In recent years, a number of papers have been written examining diﬀerent aspects of
international competition to influence the location of production. We contribute to
this growing literature by arguing that product diﬀerentiation, a factor that has been
largely overlooked, may aﬀect the FDI location choice, investment policy and national
welfare in interesting ways. This paper considers the choice of a monopolistic firm as
to whether it should invest in the introduction of a second, horizontally diﬀerentiated
variety of a good that it currently produces and sells in a two-country regional economy.
Location matters because the firm has to pay trade costs in selling to its foreign market.
We assume that one country is larger than the other and consequently, in line with
the established literature, the production of the original variety takes place in this
larger nation. The firm’s decision, then, is not just whether or not to introduce the
new variety, but where to produce this variety.
An example of a firm that has chosen to divide its portfolio of varieties across a region
in the face of (anticipated) trade costs is Jaguar Land Rover (JLR). This firm, having
previously concentrated all of its European production in the UK, has built a factory
in Slovakia where it will concentrate the production of its Discovery and new Defender
models. This has occurred at a time of uncertainty regarding the UK’s future relation-
ship with the EU in light of the Brexit referendum. While their future relationship is
uncertain, most scenarios predict an increase in the costs of trading products between
1Overviews of competition for FDI can be found in, e.g. UNCTAD (1996), Oman (2000), Charlton
(2003) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
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the UK and continental Europe. In anticipation of this, our model suggests that firms
may choose to split their product lines over factories in more than one location.2
We examine the factors influencing the firm’s choice and, in particular, how fiscal com-
petition between the two nations to attract this second new FDI aﬀects the outcome
in equilibrium. In this setting, we define these factors to be: a market-size eﬀect, a
product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect, and an import-substitution eﬀect. Given the existence of
intra-regional trade costs, all else equal, the firm has an incentive to invest in the larger
country in order to save on these trade costs, reflecting the market-size eﬀect. The
product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect concerns the firm’s increasing incentive to co-locate the
production of its existing and new varieties as the two varieties become more diﬀerenti-
ated. Finally, the import-substitution eﬀect arises from a country’s preference for locally
produced goods over imported goods, since the price of the former is cheaper than that
of the latter. Our results show that the firm’s location choice is determined exclusively
by the interaction between the market-size eﬀect and the product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect,
both of which (as defined) work to attract the FDI to the larger market. Given the
existence of intra-regional trade costs, the firm seeks to establish its new production
facility in the location that minimizes these expenses across both varieties of its prod-
uct. Thus one or both of these eﬀects must be weak if the smaller country is to have the
opportunity of attracting the FDI. If, for instance, the product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect is
very weak and the varieties are therefore close substitutes for one another, then the
firm will have an incentive to spatially separate its two plants. If, instead, the varieties
are strongly diﬀerentiated from each other, the firm will locate the production of both
varieties in the country that provides the larger domestic market.
When we consider the role of fiscal competition in influencing the location decision
of the firm, we find that it is entirely impotent. Thus while the import-substitution
eﬀect creates an incentive for the rival governments to make bids in order to attract
the FDI, in equilibrium it has no eﬀect on the choice of location. Furthermore, the
location decision made independently by the MNE is eﬃcient, such that the policy
competition merely results in transfers between the host of the FDI and the MNE. With
respect to the distribution eﬀects from the FDI, the competition for FDI may Pareto
weakly improve the national welfare of the competing countries when the host nation’s
geographic advantage is suﬃciently strong that it is able to tax the MNE in equilibrium.
2See https://www.ft.com/content/f2c6e930-6d7f-11e8-852d-d8b934ﬀ5ﬀa for further details.
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The existing literature has addressed the market-size and import-substitution eﬀects
but, as far as we know, the product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect that we identify in this paper
is new to the literature of tax competition with imperfectly competitive markets.
In our benchmark model, the degree of product diﬀerentiation between the two va-
rieties is exogenously given. We extend the model to allow product diﬀerentiation to
be an endogenous choice of the firm, studying what level the firm would choose if
it were given this opportunity and the consequent impact on the equilibrium under
fiscal competition. We find that the costly choice of product diﬀerentiation can have
far-reaching eﬀects with respect to both the location of the production of the second
variety and the tax/subsidy that it will face. We also extend the model to consider the
scenario under which the two varieties are produced by two competing firms, in order
to understand how market structure influences the outcome of fiscal competition with
diﬀerentiated products. It turns out that, compared with the benchmark model, the
circumstances under which the smaller country becomes the host to the new variety
are reduced, regardless of whether there is fiscal competition for FDI or not.
Our analysis has interesting implications for international investment policy. There has
been a hot policy debate about the possible eﬀects on the competing countries of their
engaging in a “bidding war” for FDI. The opponents of FDI competition argue that
the competition results in a pure waste of the competing countries’ resources and may
weaken their public finances and distort the location of investment. The advocates of
FDI competition argue against tax harmonization since it is, eﬀectively, a governmental
tax and spending cartel, which is every bit as objectionable as a private cartel. Our
analysis suggests that although the MNE’s location choice is always eﬃcient, FDI
competition can erode the welfare of competing countries when neither country has an
overwhelming edge over its rival in the FDI competition and the winner has to pay
a subsidy in equilibrium to the MNE in order to attract the FDI. This might lead to
a call for international cooperation in investment policy.3 However, when the winning
country has an advantage in FDI competition that cannot be matched by its rival,
there is no need for tax harmonization as the firm pays a tax to the host country in
equilibrium.
3Also see UNCTAD (2012) and UNCTAD (2015).
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Related literature
With strong scale economies, firms will choose to concentrate their production of any
variety of a good in a single location, servicing consumers in other markets through
exports. In the face of trade costs, the choice of location takes on greater importance,
as firms will find it more profitable to produce in larger, less competitive markets
compared to producing in a smaller market in the presence of domestic rivals.
In Brander and Krugman (1983), costly trade between two imperfectly competitive
firms can arise, despite them both producing an identical product. This paper became
the benchmark for a vast literature analysing the location of regional economic ac-
tivity in the presence of trade costs, scale economies, market-size asymmetries, and
government policies. Our paper contributes to this literature by considering the loca-
tion choice of a multiproduct firm in such a regional setting and whether this is aﬀected
by international competition to attract the FDI.
Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) show that multiproduct firms, which produce horizon-
tally diﬀerentiated products, may simultaneously engage in intraindustry FDI and in-
traindustry trade across two identical countries. They extend the Brander and Krugman
framework of two identical countries, each home to a single firm, by assuming that each
firm produces two imperfectly competitive varieties of the good. They then examine the
incentives facing firms to produce one of their goods in the foreign market, resulting in
two-way FDI and countries importing the foreign-produced manufactures of their home
firms. The reason for the cross-hauling FDI in Baldwin and Ottaviano is that multi-
product firms use trade costs to reduce inter-variety competition by placing production
of some varieties abroad. This idea is similar to the product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect ad-
dressed in our model. We depart from the assumption of identical countries and show
that the FDI location choice is driven by the interplay of the product-diﬀerentiation
eﬀect and the market-size eﬀect.
Haufler and Wooton (1999) focus on diﬀerences in market size in order to determine
which country will succeed in attracting the FDI of a single-product firm. They examine
how the investment choice is influenced by intergovernmental competition to attract the
FDI. They find that the larger country always wins and, if there is a suﬃciently large
diﬀerential in the sizes of the two countries, the larger country may attract the FDI in
equilibrium with a positive tax, despite the smaller, unsuccessful country being willing
to subsidize the firm’s investment. Ferrett and Wooton (2010) build on the Haufler
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and Wooton framework by asking how the equilibrium outcome is changed when the
countries are competing for FDI from two firms producing a homogeneous good. If
both firms invest in the same country, they experience more competition than if the
firms were to spatially separate their FDI. In this latter case, the firm investing in the
smaller country is at a disadvantage. If the size diﬀerence between the two countries is
suﬃciently great, the firms will accept the more competitive market environment arising
from both investing in the larger country. In our paper, we treat the entry of the first
plant as exogenous and consider only the location choice of the new investment, while
we also move away from the assumption that the two goods are perfect substitutes.
Our contribution to these two streams of the literature is in investigating the interac-
tions between product diﬀerentiation and market size. We examine the location choice
for a firm’s new production facility, when goods are imperfect substitutes and poten-
tial host countries diﬀer in size. The single firm in our model internalizes the potential
competition between the two varieties it produces, choosing where (and if) to make
its investment and whether this decision is influenced by international competition to
attract the FDI.
Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) also have an asymmetry in country size but, in addition,
consider the implications of there being a domestic firm already producing in the larger
country. The presence of this incumbent firm makes the domestic market of the larger
country more competitive for the investing firm and may lead the latter to choose to
locate its FDI in the smaller country. In this setting, international policy competition
can result in a more eﬃcient location choice by the firm.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out our benchmark
model in which a firm introduces a second variety of its good to the region. Sections 3
and 4 examine the firm’s location choice without and with fiscal competition for FDI,
respectively. In Section 5, we discuss the welfare implications of the fiscal competition.
In Sections 6 and 7, we depart from the benchmark model to consider two variants
where we allow the degree of product diﬀerentiation to be endogenous and then as-
suming that the second variety is produced by a competing firm. The final section
concludes.4
4Some technical discussions can be found in the Appendix.
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2 The baseline model
We consider a partial equilibrium model of production and consumption in a regional
setting. There are two countries in a region, indexed by  ∈ {}. The market size of
 is normalized to 1 while  is the market size of country , where  ≥ 1.5 An MNE
owned by agents outside of the region can produce two varieties of the consumption
good, indexed by   ∈ {1 2}. Let  denote the market price of variety  in country
, while  is the corresponding per-capita quantity demanded of variety  in country
. Given our assumptions about the sizes of the two countries, the total demand for
variety  in country  is  =  while the total demand for that variety in country
 is  =  .
Initially only a single variety, good 1, is available as the result of past FDI in the region
by the MNE. In this situation, the inverse demand of a representative consumer in
country  for this variety is given by 1 = 1 − 1. The marginal cost of production
is assumed to be the same in both countries and, for simplicity, set at zero. However,
exports of the good incur a transport cost of   0 per unit. On that basis, we anticipate
that the MNE will have established its production plant for the first variety in the larger
country in order to serve the regional market.6 We further assume that sunk costs of
investment are suﬃciently large that the firm will not choose to move the production
of this variety at any point.
The MNE faces the decision as to whether or not it should introduce to the region
a new variety of the product, good 2, that is horizontally diﬀerentiated from good 1,
the existing variety. Its decision to make the investment will depend upon a number
of factors, including production and trade costs, the strength of demand for the good,
consumers’ love of variety, and the degree to which the two varieties are diﬀerent from
one another. If the new variety is made available in the regional market, we assume
that the inverse demand for variety  by a representative consumer in country  is:7
 = 1−  −  (1)
where  6= . The parameter  ∈ [0 1] measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
5 measures the market size of country  relative to that of country .
6This supposition is in line with existing models, e.g. Haufler and Wooton (1999).
7See the Appendix for our discussion of the quasi-linear utility function from which the inverse-
demand systems are derived. In the main text, this is implicitly assumed.
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Clearly, as  approaches unity, the two varieties become even closer substitutes for each
other. In contrast, when  falls, the two varieties become increasingly diﬀerentiated such
that they become distinct goods at  = 0.
The cost of importing goods from outside of the region is assumed to be prohibitive.
Hence, if the MNE wishes to introduce a new variety into the region, it must make an
investment in one of the two countries.8 When the MNE decides to invest in country
, it has to pay a fixed cost to establish a new plant to produce the new variety. If the
firm wishes to co-locate production and manufacture both varieties in country , it
can do so by paying a fixed cost to upgrade its existing plant. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that these fixed costs are the same and equal to   0.9 Exporting variety
2 incurs the same cost of  per unit. We assume that the trade cost is suﬃciently small
that:
  (1− ) 
This assumption guarantees that the MNE should be able to service both countries’
demands for the two varieties irrespective of its location choice for the new investment.
The fixed cost of FDI and the trade cost are the only costs that the MNE faces in order
to set up and supply both varieties in the regional market. There are two asymmetries
already in the model that will aﬀect the choice of location of the new variety: the
countries diﬀer in size; while the MNE’s production of the first variety is already located
in the larger country.
The incentives facing the agents in the model are as follows. The MNE receives its
profits net of any tax or subsidy that the host country of its new investment puts in
place. Each country’s national welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus of its citizens
together with tax revenues. Consumer surplus will rise when production takes place
within the country but this may be accompanied by a fall in tax revenues if a subsidy
has to be paid to attract the FDI. As the MNE is assumed to be owned by agents
outside of the region, profits of the MNE are not part of either nation’s welfare.
8We make this assumption since the trade versus FDI choice is well understood from the literature
on trade costs and foreign direct investment. See, e.g. Neary (2009) for a survey. It is not the focus of
our paper.
9This assumption is in line with previous contributions such as Haufler and Wooton (1999) and
Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). It should be noted that we assume oﬀ economies of scope in our analysis.
If this is the case, it is easy to see that all else equal, the chance for the MNE to locate production of
the new variety in the larger country will be increased.
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If the countries engage in fiscal competition to attract the FDI, then they and the MNE
play a two-stage game of complete information in order to determine the location of
the production of the new variety, good 2. In the first stage of the game, each country
simultaneously and non-cooperatively announces its oﬀer of a lump-sum subsidy  to
the MNE, conditional on it being chosen as host of the new FDI.10 In the second stage,
after observing the oﬀers, the MNE makes its location choice for its new investment,
then services the regional demand from that country. Table 1 summarises the stages of
the game.
Sequence of moves
Stage 1 A and B announce oﬀers to attract the new FDI
Stage 2 Firm chooses its location, invests, produces and sells in both countries
Table 1
We introduce the following notation to represent the locations of the production of
the two varieties. We have assumed that the existing variety, good 1, is produced in
country , so the outcomes diﬀer as to where the second variety, good 2, is produced.
We denote the situation when the MNE decides against supplying the new variety in
the regional market as (∅). () is the case where the MNE co-locates production
in the larger country , while () is when the MNE makes the new investment in
the smaller country . The corresponding equilibrium values for the three cases are
indicated by subscripts ∅, , and  for (∅), () and (), respectively. As
usual, we solve the model by backward induction.
3 Location choice without fiscal competition
In this section, we analyse the MNE’s location choice when countries do not engage
in fiscal competition for FDI. The countries refrain from making oﬀers to attract the
new FDI while maintaining their existing, exogenous policies, which we assume to be
the same across the two countries. This will allow us to establish the degree to which
country  presents a more or less attractive destination for the new FDI, as compared
to country . We can then examine the MNE’s profit-maximizing location choice given
the relative geographic advantages of the two countries.
10The subsidy becomes a lump-sum tax if  is strictly negative.
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Firstly, we determine whether or not the MNE has an incentive to introduce the new
variety into the region. When the MNE decides upon (∅), where it focuses on its
existing variety and foregoes the regional production and sale of the new variety, good 2,
our model replicates Haufler and Wooton (1999). In this case, it is easy to show that:
1 = 1− 2  

1 =
1
2
;
1 = 1 + 2  

1 =
1
2
;
∅ = 18 (1− )
2  ∅ = 8 ; (2)
∗∅ = 14
£ + (1− )2¤ ;
where ∅ denotes country ’s consumer surplus and ∗∅ represents the MNE’s profits
in the equilibrium in which a single variety is produced.
If the fixed investment cost  is relatively small, then the MNE will introduce the new
variety to the region because its operating profits net of the investment cost will be
larger than ∗∅. When the MNE chooses to produce the new variety in country ,
exporting both varieties to country , it receives operating profits of:
 =  £¡1− 1 − 2 ¢ 1 + ¡1− 1 − 2 ¢ 2 ¤
+
¡
1− 1 − 2 − 
¢ 1 + ¡1− 1 − 2 − ¢ 2 
It is straightforward to calculate the MNE’s equilibrium sales and prices of each variety
in the two markets. We have:11
1 = 2 = 1− 2 (1 + )  

1 = 2 = 12 (1 + );
1 = 2 = 1 + 2  

1 = 2 = 12 
Consequently, when the MNE chooses to locate the production of the new variety in
country , its equilibrium operating profits are:
∗ = 12 (1 + )
£ + (1− )2¤  (3)
11Note that our results on prices and quantities are in line with the results obtained in Amir,
Jin, Pech, and Tröge (2016). Given our demand structure, for monopoly firms supplying at least two
goods with constant marginal cost, the price for each good is independent of demand cross-eﬀects (the
parameter  in our model), and the number and characteristics of other goods. However, equilibrium
outputs do depend on these relationships.
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We note that: ∗
∗∅ =
2
(1 + )  1 (4)
The MNE has higher operating profits when it produces both varieties in country 
than when it produces a single variety. Therefore, if the fixed investment cost,  , of
introducing the second variety is relatively small, then the MNE will have an incentive
to manufacture both horizontally diﬀerentiated goods in the region. We henceforth
assume that  is suﬃciently small to guarantee that the firm wishes to introduce the
new variety, good 2, in the regional market, a suﬃcient condition for which is that
  ¡∗ − ∗∅¢.12
Alternatively, theMNE could choose to produce the new variety in country, exporting
it to country . In that case, it would receive operating profits of:
 =  £¡1− 1 − 2 ¢ 1 + ¡1− 1 − 2 − ¢ 2 ¤
+
¡
1− 1 − 2 − 
¢ 1 + ¡1− 1 − 2 ¢ 2 
It is easy to calculate the MNE’s equilibrium sales and prices of each variety in the two
markets as:13
1 = (1− )− 2 (1− 2)  

1 =
1−  (1− )
2 (1− 2) 
2 = 1−  (1− )2 (1− 2)  

2 =
(1− )− 
2 (1− 2) ;
1 = 1 + 2  

1 =
1
2

2 = 12  

2 =
1 + 
2

Our assumption that   (1− ), ensures that both 1  0 and 2  0. From these
expressions, we can determine that the equilibrium operating profits of the MNE, when
it chooses to locate the production of the new variety in country , will be:
∗ = ( + 1)4 (1− 2)
£
1 + (1− )2 − 2 (1− )¤  (5)
12Obviously, it will be less interesting when the fixed investment costs are so high that the MNE’s
net profits from manufacturing the new variety are less than its profits when it only sells the existing
variety. In fact, the results there can be inferred from Haufler and Wooton (1999).
It may be argued that, compared with the case where the two countries do not engage in FDI
competition, the competition may provide the MNE with a suﬃcient incentive to make the new
investment. This may be true. But it should be noted that the fixed investment cost and the scale
eﬀect associated with it are not the focus of this paper.
13Again, the results are in line with those obtained in Amir, Jin, Pech, and Tröge (2016).
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We are now able to determine the MNE’s location choice for its new investment when
the two countries do not engage in fiscal competition for the new FDI. Expressions (3)
and (5), provide a measure of country ’s geographic advantage, the diﬀerence in the
MNE’s profit from locating its new investment in country  rather than in country ,
where:
∆ ≡ ∗ − ∗ = 4 (1− 2) [( − 1) (2− )− 2 ( − 1 + )]  (6)
At one extreme, when the two countries are the same size ( = 1) and given the
existence of intra-regional trade costs, ∆ and the consequent FDI location choice are
entirely driven by the degree of product diﬀerentiation between the two varieties. In
short, as consumers in country  have an access to domestic production of the first
variety, profit maximization will require the firm to locate the new investment in coun-
try  in order to reduce its trade costs of supplying an identically sized market. When
 is close to unity (while  is relatively small), then the similarity in the varieties may
be suﬃcient that each national market is served exclusively by its domestic produc-
tion facility and no trade takes place. This outcome is similar to trade-cost jumping,
horizontal FDI. Lower values of  would result in consumers in each market wanting
to consume both varieties, resulting in trade but the second variety would continue to
be produced in country . Only when the varieties are completely distinct from each
other ( = 0), would the profit diﬀerence disappear such that the firm would not care
about the location of the second variety.
As  increases, giving country  a larger population than that of country , then
all else equal country  becomes the relatively more attractive host for the new FDI,
except in the limiting case of  = 1, where the production of a second, identical vari-
ety is only justifiable in country . As the products become more diﬀerentiated, the
firm’s incentive to locate the production of both varieties in the larger market becomes
stronger, such that when  = 0, the varieties are distinct from one another and ∆ is
guaranteed to be positive. This latter result replicates Haufler and Wooton (1999) for
a separate, additional product in that the market-size advantage drives the MNE to
choose the larger country  for its FDI.14
In summary, the MNE’s location choice for its new investment is driven by the in-
teraction between what we define as a product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect and a market-size
eﬀect. Products are more distinctive, and hence the product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect is
14It is easy to see that, when  = 0, ∆ = 0, and the location choice is irrelevant.
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stronger, the smaller is the value of . As  increases, the diﬀerence in the sizes of
the two countries becomes more pronounced, strengthening the market-size eﬀect. The
stronger these eﬀects are, the more attractive the larger marketplace becomes, giving
it a greater geographic advantage. Thus the interplay between  and  , for any given
level of  , determines which country is the more attractive location for the production
of the second variety of the product. It is useful to define a critical level of product
diﬀerentiation, ∗, a function of  (and ) such that the two eﬀects exactly oﬀset one
another, where:
∗ ≡ ( − 1) (2− )
2 [ − (1− )]  (7)
We can then summarize our discussion in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 When countries do not engage in FDI competition, the MNE will locate
its new investment in the smaller country  if and only if   ∗; otherwise it will
produce the new variety in the larger country .15
Proof See expression (6). Setting ∆ = 0 immediately implies the Proposition. ¥
We discuss this result with the help of Figure 1. The horizontal axis measures  ,
the market size of country  relative to that of country , while the vertical axis
measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation, . The curve represents the ∗ threshold
determined by expression (7). When parameter configurations lie to the left of the
curve, the MNE locates production of the new variety in country , otherwise the MNE
makes investment in country . It is easy to see that the vertical axis is in the region
where the MNE chooses to invest in country . As  −→ 1, country ’s market-size
advantage diminishes and the product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect drives the MNE to produce
the new variety in country . It is also straightforward to see that the horizontal axis
is in the region where the MNE produces the new variety in country . As  −→ 0,
the MNE’s existing and new varieties become distinct goods. Hence, the market-size
eﬀect drives the MNE to locate the production of its new variety in country .
Our result diﬀers from that of Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), where the FDI location choice
is determined by the interaction between the market-size eﬀect and the competition
generated by two firms producing in the market. In contrast, we have no inter-firm
competition as the second variety is produced by the same firm. In our model, when
15We therefore omit the knife-edge cases.
12
Figure 1: Location of the second variety in absence of policy competition
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theMNEmakes the new investment in country, it enjoys the market-size advantage of
the larger country. The firm may be “cannibalizing” its own market but, as it produces
both varieties, it maximizes industry profits, whereas the new (foreign) product in
Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) directly competes with that of the incumbent local firm.
4 Fiscal competition for FDI
We now examine the two countries’ incentives to subsidize the MNE’s FDI. Consumer
welfare was irrelevant to the location choice of the MNE in the previous section, as
the firm made its decision purely on the basis of its profitability. But the FDI location
choice has an impact on consumers. The national levels of consumer surplus when a
second variety is introduced are:
 = 
2 + 2 (1− ) (1− )
8 (1− 2)  
 =
 [ 2 + 2 (1− ) (1− )]
8 (1− 2) ;
 = (1− )
2
4 (1 + )  
 =

4 (1 + );
(8)
where  is the consumer surplus in country  when the second variety is produced in
country ,   ∈ {}. When we compare the terms in expression (8) with consumer
surplus in countries with a single variety, expression (2), it is clear that consumers in
both nations benefit from the introduction of the second variety. Beyond that, citizens
of both countries will generally gain more from the FDI for the second variety taking
place in their own country than in the other nation. We see this by comparing the
benefits of being the host to production of the second variety to importing it, defining
the net benefits to the countries from attracting the FDI as:
∆ ≡  −  = 8 (1− 2) [2−  − 2 (1− )]  (9)
∆ ≡  −  = 8 (1− 2) [2−  − 2]  (10)
Our maintained assumption that   (1− ) is a suﬃcient condition for ∆   0 for
both countries,  ∈ {}. Each country benefits from hosting the production of the
new variety, as the prices of locally produced goods are lower than those of the imports,
resulting in greater consumption surplus under FDI. Consequently, countries will be
prepared to compete with each other by oﬀering subsidies as inducements to attract the
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FDI to their shores. We define this impetus to attract FDI to be the import-substitution
eﬀect.
In the first stage of the game of competition for the new FDI, countries  and  will
oﬀer lump-sum subsidies (negative taxes)  and , respectively. In the second stage
of the game, after it has observed these oﬀers, the MNE will choose its investment
location in order to maximize its after-tax profits. Therefore, it will establish a new
production plant in country  if and only if ∗ +   ∗ + . Otherwise, it will
choose to produce the new variety in country . Clearly, in addition to the trade-
oﬀ between the market-size and the production-diﬀerentiation eﬀects discussed in the
previous section, the MNE’s location choice is now aﬀected by the subsidies on oﬀer
from the two countries, which are directly linked to the import-substitution eﬀect.
The Nash fiscal competition game is a slight variant of a first-price, sealed-bid auction
of complete information, in which the player with the highest willingness-to-pay for
the object wins it with a payment equal to the second-highest bidder’s willingness-to-
pay. In FDI competition, a country’s net benefit from the new investment is simply
its valuation of the FDI. The complication in fiscal competition models of this type
is that the country with the highest valuation of the FDI may not win the MNE’s
new investment. The MNE may have diﬀerent pre-tax profits arising from its location
choice (the pre-tax geographic advantage enjoyed by one of the countries) and this has
to be taken into account together with the diﬀerence in the countries’ valuation of FDI.
With this in mind, we can characterize the equilibrium of the first stage game. The
smaller country  will win the FDI competition if and only if:
∆  ∆ +∆; (11)
where its winning bid is equal to:
∗ = ∆ +∆ (12)
Otherwise, the larger country  will attract the MNE and its winning bid is equal to:
∗ = ∆ −∆ (13)
This leads us to the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 When the two countries compete for the MNE’s new investment, the
firm will choose to locate the production of the new variety in the smaller country  if
and only if   ∗; otherwise it will make the new investment in the larger country .
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Proof Condition (11) implies the Proposition immediately. ¥
A direct implication of this Proposition is that the international competition to attract
the FDI has no impact on the MNE’s location choice. Thus allocative eﬃciency is
unaﬀected by the equilibrium oﬀers made by the countries. There is a distributional
impact however, in that the oﬀers made as a result of the competition to attract the
FDI will involve transfers between citizens of the winning country and the MNE.16
Given this, we now determine the direction of the equilibrium transfer. That is, we
shall work out whether the winning country subsidizes the MNE or attracts the FDI
despite charging a tax.17
4.1 The smaller country attracts the FDI
First, we consider the case when the smaller country  wins the FDI competition. In
order to do so, we define a new threshold level of product diﬀerentiation:
∗∗ = (3 − 2) (2− )
2 [3 − 2 (1− )]  (14)
As ∗  ∗∗, this new threshold corresponds to a level of product diﬀerentiation such
that the two varieties are suﬃciently similar that the FDI will take place in country .
The remaining question is whether the FDI is attracted in equilibrium with a subsidy
or a tax. This is clarified in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 When country  attracts the MNE’s new investment, it collects a tax
from the MNE if and only if   ∗∗, otherwise, it subsidizes the FDI in equilibrium.
16Since we have linear demands for diﬀerentiated products and constant marginal costs, it turns out
that the diﬀerence between country ’s valuation of the FDI and that of country , ∆ −∆,
is proportionate to the diﬀerence in the MNE’s profit from locating its new investment in country 
rather than in country , ∆. As the former is one half of the latter, we have our result.
In our model, fiscal competition does not change FDI location choice, a result shared with Haufler
and Wooton (1999) and Ma (2013). In contrast, Barros and Cabral (2000), Fumagalli (2003), Bjorvatn
and Eckel (2006) and Ma (2017) all show the situations where FDI competition may change MNEs’
location choice.
17The MNE always has an option not to introduce the new variety into the region, in which case
it earns ∗∅ . Therefore, when countries have an opportunity to tax the MNE, the tax   0 should
also satisfy the MNE’s participation constraint. When the firm locates in country , this corresponds
to
¡∗ + ∗ ¢− ∗∅ ≥  . Our results do not change qualitatively.
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Proof Rewriting expression (12), we find:
∗ =  [3 − 2 (1− )]
4 (1− 2) (
∗∗ − )  (15)
Given that   ∗  0, then ∗  0 if and only if   ∗∗. ¥
The larger country ’s valuation of the FDI is strictly positive, while the diﬀerence in
pre-tax profits makes the MNE prefer to invest in the smaller country . When  = ∗∗,
these elements exactly oﬀset one another such that country  can attract the FDI
with zero subsidy when country  makes its best oﬀer. When   ∗∗, the varieties are
suﬃciently alike that country , the host of the existing variety’s production facilities,
is less enthusiastic about attracting production of the new variety, while investing in
country  becomes more profitable. As a result, country  can win the competition
with a tax.
4.2 The larger country attracts the FDI
Things are more complicated when country  wins the new FDI. This happens when
  ∗, which arises when the larger market size of country  and the degree of product
diﬀerentiation are such that the firm decides that it is more profitable to locate both
varieties in the same country (see Propositions 1 and 2). We show now that country 
can attract the new investment with a tax, if the diﬀerence in market size is suﬃciently
great and the two varieties are suﬃciently distinct from one another. First we define a
new threshold value for the degree of product diﬀerentiation ∗∗∗ as:
∗∗∗ ≡ (2 − 3) (2− )
2 [2 − 3 (1− )]  (16)
Given that our measure of product diﬀerentiation is defined over the unit interval,
∗∗∗ is restricted such that ∗∗∗ ∈ [0 1] only when  ≥ 32. Taking into account this
restriction, it can easily be shown that ∗∗∗  ∗. We can also use expression (16) to
rewrite expression (13) for country ’s winning bid as:
∗ =  [2 − 3 (1− )]
4 (1− 2) (− 
∗∗∗)  (17)
We state our result in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 4 Consider the case where country  wins the FDI competition.
(i) When   32, country  taxes the MNE if and only if   ∗∗∗; otherwise, it
subsidizes the MNE.
(ii) When  ≤ 32, whenever country  attracts the new investment, it must pay a
subsidy to the MNE in equilibrium.
Proof
(i) When   32, we see from expression (17) that:
∗  0 if and only if   ∗∗∗  ∗;
∗  0 if and only if ∗∗∗    ∗
(ii) When  = 32, ∗∗∗ = 0, and so ∗  0. If the size of country  fell below
 = 32, its geographic advantage from having a larger domestic market would be
eroded. The firm’s profits from locating in country  decline as the country shrinks in
size. In order to match the best oﬀer from country , country  will have to increase
its subsidy in order to persuade the firm to locate within its borders. Thus country 
will continue to attract the FDI whenever   ∗ but the subsidy that it has to oﬀer
in equilibrium will rise as  falls. ¥
Country ’s valuation of the FDI is strictly positive, while the MNE has an incentive to
locate production of the new variety in country  whenever the latter country oﬀers a
suﬃciently large market and the two varieties are relatively distinct. When country  is
not much larger than country  and the varieties become quite similar, then country 
will have to pay the MNE a subsidy in equilibrium in order to get the new investment.
We now turn to an analysis of the welfare consequences of FDI competition.
5 Welfare implications of fiscal competition
First, we study whether fiscal competition to attract the FDI achieves allocative eﬃ-
ciency. We then turn to examine whether a competing country gains or loses from the
FDI competition, compared with the situation where the countries do not engage in
it. As noted in the previous section, the competition for FDI does not aﬀect the FDI
location choice. Indeed, it is eﬃcient, as stated in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 5 The MNE’s location choice for its new investment is eﬃcient, in that
it maximizes total world welfare, regardless of whether or not there is international
competition for the FDI.
Proof When   ∗, the MNE chooses to produce the new variety in the smaller coun-
try  irrespective of whether or not the two countries engage in the FDI competition.
With appropriate substitutions, condition (11) can be rewritten as
£ +  + ∗¤−£ +  + ∗¤  0. Similar arguments apply for the case when   ∗, and the MNE
makes the new investment in the larger country . ¥
That FDI competition achieves allocative eﬃciency is well known in the existing lit-
erature.18 We have shown that this also holds in our model, in that the subsidies or
taxes in equilibrium have no impact on the firm’s choice of location for the FDI.
Fiscal competition for FDI will, however, aﬀect the international distribution of the
benefits of economic activity. As the fiscal competition does not aﬀect the location of
the FDI, the “losing” country is unaﬀected in equilibrium. Fiscal competition results in
a redistribution of rents between the firm and the “winning” country. We have already
established the thresholds that determine which country wins and whether it does so
with a tax or a subsidy. If the firm making the investment has its ownership in the rest
of the world (that is, in neither country  nor country ), then an equilibrium tax will
increase regional welfare while a subsidy will reduce it.
As we noted in the above analysis, all else equal, the larger market size of country 
relative to that of country  gives an edge to country , while close similarity in
the varieties (a low degree of product diﬀerentiation) can put country  in a more
advantageous position in attracting the MNE’s new investment. The larger a country’s
geographic advantage, the greater its ability to tax the FDI in equilibrium. If the
winning country’s edge over its rival is insuﬃciently large, then it needs to subsidize
the FDI in equilibrium. However, if the winning country’s advantage is great enough,
then it can tax the firm while capturing the FDI.19
18See, e.g. Barros and Cabral (2000), Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), Ma (2013) and Ma (2017). Though
Haufler and Wooton (1999) do not discuss the welfare eﬀects of FDI competition, their analysis also
implies this result.
19That fiscal competition for FDI may Pareto weakly improve national welfare of the competing
countries seems to be interesting, and this result is in line with Ma (2013). Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006)
obtain a similar result. That happens when one of the competing countries does not benefit from the
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Figure 2: Corporate taxes or subsidies in equilibrium
20
Figure 2 adds the two additional thresholds, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, to the previous diagram in
order to illustrate the tax/subsidy implications of policy competition. The original ∗
curve is unchanged, since we have established that policy competition does not aﬀect
the MNE’s location choice, but merely aﬀects the after-tax earnings of the firm and
the rents accrued by the host nation.
The curve marked ∗∗ corresponds to expression (14). When parameter configurations
are above the curve, country  taxes the MNE, and competition for FDI Pareto-weakly
improves national welfare of the competing countries. When parameter configurations
are between the ∗ and ∗∗ curves, country  subsidizes FDI, and competition for
FDI Pareto-weakly reduces national welfare of the competing countries. The curve
marked ∗∗∗ is the threshold given by expression (16). When parameter configurations
are below this curve, country  taxes the MNE and FDI competition Pareto-weakly
enhances national welfare of the competing countries. When parameter configurations
are between the ∗ and ∗∗∗ curves, country  subsidizes the MNE and FDI competition
Pareto weakly reduces national welfare of the competing countries. Therefore, when
parameter configurations are close to the ∗ curve, meaning that no country has an
overwhelming geographic advantage, the winning country needs to pay a subsidy to
the MNE in order to oﬀset the subsidy oﬀer made by its rival. When the winning
country has a suﬃciently strong geographic advantage relative to its rival, reflected in
parameter configurations far from the ∗ curve, then the winning country can attract
the FDI while taxing the MNE.
Moving horizontally across the Figure 2 reveals the full range of possible outcomes as
 increases while  remains constant, starting from the initial intersection with the
vertical axis where  = 1. When the two countries are the same size, the FDI will take
place in country . This is because that the firm will wish to separate spatially its two
plants that are producing horizontally diﬀerentiated goods. When the two goods are
suﬃciently similar, the host country is able to tax the firm. As the size of country 
relative to that of country  starts to increase, country  becomes a less attractive
destination and will have to subsidize the firm in order to capture the FDI. Eventually
as  increases, country ’s subsidy will be insuﬃcient to win the FDI and country ’s
subsidy will, instead, attract the new investment. With a suﬃciently large asymmetry
entry of the MNE; and hence, its valuation of FDI is strictly negative. This increases the bargaining
power of the other country and may lead to taxation of FDI rather than subsidies. In contrast, we
derive the result in the situation where both countries have an economic incentive to attract FDI.
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in country size, the second variety will, in equilibrium, be produced in country despite
the fact that the firm is taxed for locating there.
In a similar fashion, we can analyse the outcomes for a given size diﬀerential between
the two countries but for diﬀerent degrees of substitutability between the two varieties
as we move vertically up across the Figure 2. When the two goods are completely
distinct ( = 0), the production of both will be located in the larger country. If 
is suﬃciently large, country  taxes the FDI in equilibrium. As  rises, country 
becomes a more attractive location for production of the second variety, such that the
tax/subsidy and location outcomes change accordingly.
We next consider, in the following two sections two variants of our benchmark model.
First, we allow the degree of product diﬀerentiation between the two varieties to be
endogenous, asking what level the firm would choose if it were given the opportunity
and the consequent impact on the equilibrium under fiscal competition. We then study
the scenario under which the two varieties are produced by competing firms in order
to understand how market structure influences the outcome of fiscal competition with
diﬀerentiated products.
6 Endogenous product diﬀerentiation
We let the firm decide upon the degree of product diﬀerentiation between its two
varieties of the good. We assume that this choice is made prior to Stage 1 of the game
detailed in Table 1. Using backward induction, the MNE chooses the degree of product
diﬀerentiation that maximizes its after-tax profits, taking the equilibrium outcome of
the subsequent game into account.20
First, suppose that there is no cost associated with product diﬀerentiation and the two
countries do not engage in fiscal competition. It is immediately obvious that the MNE
will always choose to make the existing and the new varieties completely distinct from
each other (that is,  = 0) and, whenever  1, will co-locate production of the second
variety in country .21 The MNE has a strong incentive to minimize the intensity
20This is diﬀerent from the model of Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001), where the degree of product
diﬀerentiation among goods is exogenously given.
21This result corresponds to the case represented by the horizontal axis in Figure 2, which replicates
the results of Haufler and Wooton (1999).
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of the intra-brand competition between its two goods, such that the introduction of
the new variety creates its own market rather than eroding demand for the existing
product. When there is no cost to product diﬀerentiation, the firm will make them
totally diﬀerent from each other, irrespective of the location choice. But, since the
two goods would then be distinct products, locating the production of the new good
in country  would allow the MNE to enjoy the market-size advantage this country
provides.
Suppose now that the two countries engage in fiscal competition for FDI, but that
product diﬀerentiation remains costless. Despite the international competition, it is
still the case that the firm will choose  = 0, making the existing and the new varieties
completely distinct from each other, and will locate production of the new variety in
the larger country. The MNE’s pre-tax profits are highest when the two goods are
distinct, but it may have to pay taxes to the host country. It can be shown that, as
the degree of product diﬀerentiation declines, the MNE will pay less tax (or receive a
higher subsidy) from the host in equilibrium. But, eﬀectively, the impact of changes
in product diﬀerentiation on profits is first-order, while the consequence for the firm’s
tax bill is second-order such that manufacturing distinct products is optimal.
Things become more interesting if the firm has to pay a cost that rises with the degree of
product diﬀerentiation between the varieties. Suppose that the cost of introducing the
new product is increasing with the degree of product diﬀerentiation, such that the cost
rises as  declines. The slope of this function will determine the location of production
of the new variety and whether the MNE has to pay a tax to, or receive a subsidy from,
its host in equilibrium. If   1, the original variety is produced in country . If the
cost of product diﬀerentiation is relatively insignificant, the MNE would continue to
make its two varieties as distinct as possible, locate production of both in the larger
country, and pay taxes to the host. If the cost rises more steeply as  declines, the
firm will choose to limit the degree of product diﬀerentiation while receiving a subsidy
from the larger, host country. As the cost of product diﬀerentiation continues to rise,
the varieties will become increasingly similar and the production location will shift
from  to , in order to mitigate the intensity of intra-brand competition between
the two varieties. If the costs of product diﬀerentiation are suﬃciently high, the MNE
would make two near-identical products in diﬀerent countries with the host taxing the
FDI. In summary, the costly choice of product diﬀerentiation can have far-reaching
eﬀects with respect to both the location of the production of the second variety and
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the tax/subsidy that it will face.
7 Competition between two independent firms
Suppose now that, unlike our baseline model, the new (exogenously diﬀerentiated)
variety is produced by a second, foreign MNE which will compete with an incumbent,
foreign firm that is already established in the larger country .22 It can be shown
that, compared with the benchmark model, the circumstances under which the smaller
country becomes the host to the new variety are reduced, regardless of whether or not
there is fiscal competition for FDI.
It is straightforward to show that, when the two countries do not engage in fiscal
competition, the new FDI will be located in the smaller country  if and only if   2∗,
where ∗ is defined in (7). If the degree of product diﬀerentiation is below this threshold,
the two varieties are suﬃciently distinct from each other that the second MNE will co-
locate production of the new variety in country . When fiscal competition for the FDI
takes place, the threshold for product diﬀerentiation declines, such that the firm will
choose to locate the production of the new variety in country  if and only if   3∗2;
otherwise it will make the new investment in country . We discuss these results with
the help of Figure 3, which plots these thresholds in ( ) space.
In the baseline model, the single firm is concerned with the overall profits from pro-
duction of both goods. When  = ∗, the multiproduct firm is indiﬀerent as to the
location of production of the second variety, while the corresponding critical threshold
for a separate firm is 2∗. In other words, there is a range of product diﬀerentiation
 ∈ (∗ 2∗) over which a multiproduct firm would choose a spatial separation of pro-
duction, location pattern (), while an independent competitor would decide upon
co-location, ().
The reason for this is straightforward and intuitively appealing. The multiproduct firm
22This situation is diﬀerent from Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), since in their model, product market
competition is between a domestic firm in the larger country and an MNE from the rest of the world. In
our model, two foreign MNEs compete in the regional product market. This situation is also diﬀerent
from Ferrett and Wooton (2010), since they consider fiscal competition for two firms that produce
homogeneous goods, while we consider fiscal competition for a new firm that produces a diﬀerentiated
product.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium location with independent firms
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is concerned with maximizing its profits over sales of both goods that it produces.
Prior to the introduction of the second variety, sales in the smaller market are limited
by the trade cost. If the two varieties are very similar, the firm will choose to locate
production of its second variety in the smaller country in order to tap into this relatively
unexploited consumer market. Were it to co-locate its production, it would continue to
have low sales in the smaller market while the introduction of a very similar product to
the good that is already being produced would result in “cannibalization” of its larger
market, where the sales of the new variety would eat into the sales of the first product.
It can avoid this by producing the second variety in the smaller country, focusing on
the domestic sales of each of the varieties.
This concern over “cannibalization” of the home market is not shared by an indepen-
dent competitor. Such a firm compares pre-tax profits arising from locating in either
country  or country . It balances the benefit of being the only local producer in
the smaller country, and thereby having a cost advantage over the imported variety,
with locating in the larger, more profitable market where it faces greater competition
from being co-located with its rival. The diﬀerence for the independent firm is that
it is unconcerned with the impact that its choice of location will have on the exist-
ing firm’s profits from production of the first variety. Ignoring this competition leads
to the independent firm to choose co-location in some circumstance under which the
multiproduct firm will spatially separate its production. Moreover, it can be shown
that the intraindustry competition arising from having separate firms producing each
diﬀerentiated good can lead to ineﬃcient location choice with respect to the second
variety, where it should be produced in country , but is instead produced alongside
the first variety in country .23
When fiscal competition is introduced, the threshold shifts back to some degree, miti-
gating the ineﬃciency arising from there being two competing firms.24 Essentially, the
oﬀers from the governments reflect the gains to their consumers from attracting the new
FDI. Individual consumers in country  would get a greater benefit from attracting a
local producer than a similar consumer in country  would gain from local production
of a second variety of the good. This is reflected in the bids in equilibrium and pulls the
23Since the existing firm would always prefer the new firm to locate in country  rather than
co-locating in country , the eﬃciency threshold must be below 3∗2.
24Bidding incentives for the countries are the same for varieties regardless of whether they are
produced by two firms or by a multiproduct firm.
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location outcome closer to eﬃciency. Full location eﬃciency is not, however, restored
by fiscal competition because the countries are interacting with only one firm (that is
maximising its own, after-tax profits) and not those of the industry as a whole, which
occurred when a single firm produced both varieties.25
8 Summary and conclusions
In our benchmark model, an MNE chooses the location of its newmanufacturing facility
in a region in which it already produces a horizontally diﬀerentiated variety of the
good. We have considered how this choice is aﬀected by the introduction of investment
incentives by the governments of the potential host nations, where we have focussed on
the implications for domestic welfare and the firm’s after-tax profits of this international
competition to attract the FDI. We show that product diﬀerentiation can aﬀect the
FDI location choice, investment policy and national welfare in interesting ways.
We then examine two variants of the benchmark model where, on the one hand, we allow
the degree of product diﬀerentiation to be endogenous and then where we assume that
the second variety is produced by a competing firm. The results do not qualitatively
change from those that we found in the baseline model.
The existing literature has addressed the interplay between market-size and import-
substitution eﬀects but, as far as we know, the product-diﬀerentiation eﬀect that we
have introduced is new to studies of tax competition with imperfectly competitive
markets.
In our model, FDI competition does not aﬀect the MNE’s location choice. That may
be mainly because we consider policy instruments that do not aﬀect the MNE’s output
decisions. Regardless of whether the corporation tax that it faces is charged on a
lump-sum basis or proportional to its profits, the firm’s optimal output will maximise
its pre-tax profits. In contrast, the MNE’s location choice might change if the fiscal
instrument aﬀected its choice of output levels. Thus a production tax would change
the marginal cost of producing in the country and consequently result in a change in
25In Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), the larger country internalizes the competition eﬀect on its national
firm. As a result, competition for FDI achieves allocative eﬃciency, which is a diﬀerent outcome from
that of our model.
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the optimal output level. Equally, tariﬀs and export taxes would jointly aﬀect output
levels and the MNE’s location choice when countries compete to attract the FDI.
Going beyond our analysis, it would be interesting to investigate policy competition
in the situation when the MNE’s existing and new varieties are complements rather
than substitutes. A more challenging task would be to combine the basic idea of this
paper and that of Ferrett and Wooton (2010) to study tax competition for at least two
heterogeneous firms in the context of imperfect competition. We hope to report results
of these studies in near future.
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Appendix
We discuss here the quasi-linear utility function from which inverse demand systems
are derived and we show how we calculate countries’ consumer surplus when the MNE
introduces the new variety into the region. In fact, we implicitly assume that the
representative agent in each country  has a quasi-linear preference in the form of:
  =
( 1 − 1221 + (only good 1 available)
(1 + 2)− 12 (21 + 212 + 22 ) + (both goods 1 and 2 available)
,
where  is a homogenous numéraire good; 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
It is easy to check that the inverse demand systems when the MNE produces and
sells both varieties in the region (expression (1)) are derived from maximizing   =
(1 + 2)− 12 (21 + 212 + 22 ) + subject to the budget constraint. Each country’s
representative agent receives consumer surplus equal to:
 = ¡1 + 2¢− 12 ¡21 + 212 + 22 ¢− 11 − 22
The smaller country  has a single consumer, while the larger country  has 
consumers. Consequently, country ’s total consumption surplus is equal to  times
its representative agent’s consumer surplus.
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